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6
Reorienting Disclosure Debates in a
Post-Citizens United World
Katherine Shaw*

I. Introduction
Disclosure is often an afterthought in debates about money in politics.
Reformers have tended to take disclosure for granted, devoting little time to
developing and refining the affirmative case for it. They have also tended to
assume that the current disclosure regime is an effective one, at least as far as it
goes. Reformers have devoted substantial attention to the holes in the current
regime in the post-Citizens United era—so-called “dark” and “gray” money1—
and have considered ways to bring such activity into the light. Yet even if they
are successful, such expansion efforts would only bring more dollars under the
auspices of a disclosure regime in need of both stronger conceptual architecture and substantial practical improvements. So closing the gaps in the system
is only one aspect of the task.
Consistent with the mission of this volume, this chapter will first survey the
doctrine, practice, and empirics of disclosure. It will then turn to a number
of proposals for reforming the reach, quality, and impact of this mode of campaign finance regulation.2

* Katherine Shaw is Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Floersheimer Center for
Constitutional Democracy at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law at Yeshiva University.
1
Chisun Lee, Katherine Valde, Benjamin T. Brickner & Douglas Keith, Brennan
Center for Justice, Secret Spending in the States 5 (Sept. 2016), www.brennancenter
.org/sites/default/files/analysis/Secret_Spending_in_the_States.pdf (defining dark money as
“election spending by entities that do not publicly disclose their donors,” and “gray money” as
spending “by entities that disclose donors in a way that makes the original sources of money
difficult or perhaps impossible to identify.”).
2
Many of these proposals are drawn from my previous work with sociologist Jennifer Heerwig.
Jennifer A. Heerwig & Katherine Shaw, Through a Glass, Darkly: The Rhetoric and Reality of
Campaign Finance Disclosure, 102 Geo. L.J. 1443, 1449 (2014).
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II. The Doctrine and Practice of Disclosure
A. Doctrine
“Campaign finance disclosure” generally refers to laws that require both
reporting and public dissemination of information about political actors’
fundraising and spending. The term can be further divided into a few distinct
but related activities: the reporting of information about contributions and
expenditures; the public dissemination of that information; and disclaimers,
which provide the public with information about the sponsors of particular
political messages (“e.g., paid for by the ABC Committee.”)3
Mandatory disclosure has long been a feature of our law of campaign
finance. The Supreme Court’s analytical framework for disclosure is traceable, like much in the law of campaign finance, to Buckley v. Valeo,4 the
Court’s foundational consideration of the constitutionality of the Federal
Election Campaign Act (FECA).5
In addition to upholding FECA’s contribution limits and invalidating
the law’s expenditure limits, the Buckley Court upheld FECA’s disclosure
requirements in full (though subject to several important limiting principles).6
The relevant provisions of law required “political committees”7 to register with
the Federal Election Commission (FEC), and to keep records of expenditures
and contributions.8 The law also required candidates and political committees
to provide the FEC with detailed reports, which the FEC would then make
available “for public inspection and copying.”9 Beyond its candidate and political committee provisions, the law required all individuals or groups that
made independent expenditures above a certain amount “for the purpose

3

4
5

6
7

8
9

Heerwig & Shaw, supra note 2, at 1449; Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Hiding Behind the
Tax Code, The Dark Election of 2010 and Why Tax-Exempt Entities Should be Subject
to Robust Federal Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws, 16 Chap. J.L. & Pol’y 59, 79
(2010–2011).
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92–225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972), amended
by Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93–443, 88 Stat. 1263
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 431 (1974)).
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 63–64.
When Buckley was decided, FECA defined a political committee as “a group of persons that
receives ‘contributions’ or makes ‘expenditures’ of over $1,000 in a calendar year … ‘for the
purpose of … influencing’ the nomination or election of any person to federal office.” Id. at
62–63 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 432 (Supp. IV 1970)).
Id. at 63 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 432 (Supp. IV 1970)).
Id.
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of … influencing the … election, of any person to Federal office” to file a
statement with the FEC.10
The Buckley Court began its discussion with an acknowledgment that
mandatory disclosure “can seriously infringe on privacy of association and
belief guaranteed by the First Amendment.”11 This meant that disclosure
requirements could not be justified “by a mere showing of some legitimate
governmental interest,”12 but would have to survive “exacting scrutiny,” which
required both a sufficiently important government interest and a substantial
relationship between the governmental interest and the disclosure requirement.13 The Court then identified three governmental interests that, taken
together, did satisfy the “exacting scrutiny” the Constitution required.14 The
first has come to be known as the “informational” interest:
[D]isclosure provides the electorate with information as to where political
campaign money comes from and how it is spent by the candidate in order
to aid the voters in evaluating those who seek federal office. It allows voters
to place each candidate in the political spectrum more precisely than is
often possible solely on the basis of party labels and campaign speeches. The
sources of a candidate’s financial support also alert the voter to the interests
to which a candidate is most likely to be responsive and thus facilitate
predictions of future performance in office.15

Next, the Court explained that disclosure furthered an important interest in
preventing both corruption and the appearance of corruption, reasoning that
“exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity” was
likely to “discourage those who would use money for improper purposes either
before or after the election,”16 as well as to equip the public to detect “any postelection special favors that may be given in return.”17
Finally, the Court concluded that disclosure was justified by an “enforcement interest”—that is, that the law’s “recordkeeping, reporting, and

10
11

12
13
14
15
16
17

Id. at 145 (citing 52 U.S.C. § 30101, formerly§ 434(e)); accord Buckley, 424 U.S. at 63–64.
Id. at 64. To underscore the significance of this interest, the Court pointed to cases like
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1964) (holding that Alabama could not compel the
state chapter of the NAACP to disclose the names of its staff and members), and Bates v. Little
Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 527 (1960) (holding that the City of Little Rock could not demand lists of
NAACP members and staff).
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 64–66.
Id. at 66–67 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 67.
Id.
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disclosure requirements” were necessary to police compliance with FECA’s
other provisions.18
The Court found these interests “sufficiently important to outweigh the
possibility of infringement [of First Amendment rights], particularly when the
‘free functioning of our national institutions’ is involved.”19 But it left the door
open to future as-applied challenges, where there was a demonstrated “reasonable probability” that disclosure would result in “threats, harassment, or
reprisals.”20
In addition to affirming the availability of as-applied challenges, the Court
limited the sweep of disclosure requirements in two ways. First, it limited
the definition of political committee to organizations whose “major purpose
… is the nomination or election of a candidate.”21 This meant, among other
things, that only such entities were subject to the law’s committee disclosure
requirements. And second, it narrowed the independent-organization disclosure requirements to “contributions earmarked for political purposes or
authorized or requested by a candidate or his agent,” and “expenditures for
communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly
identified candidate.”22
The Court cited disclosure requirements in generally approving terms in a
number of post-Buckley cases.23 But it was not until the 2003 case McConnell
18
19
20

21
22

23

Id. at 67–68.
Id. at 66 (quoting Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 97 (1961).
Id. at 74. This discussion occurred primarily in the context of the Court’s evaluation of the
argument that a blanket exemption to the disclosure requirements was warranted for independent and third-party candidates, but its general interest-balancing analysis has been understood to apply more broadly. See id. at 72–74. In Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign
Committee, 459 U.S. 87, 102 (1982), the Court found that the Socialist Workers Party was
entitled to such an exemption from Ohio’s campaign finance disclosure law.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79.
Id. at 80. The Court tied this limiting definition to an earlier definition of “express advocacy”
as involving “express words of advocacy of election or defeat, such as ‘vote for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’
‘cast your ballot for,’ ‘Smith for Congress,’ ‘vote against,’ ‘defeat,’ ‘reject.’ ” Id. at 44 n. 52.
See, e.g., Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 223 (1999) (O’Connor,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]otal disclosure has been recognized as the
essential cornerstone to effective campaign finance reform and fundamental to the political system.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); FEC v. Mass. Citizens for
Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 262 (1986) (invalidating FECA’s independent corporate expenditure
limitations as applied to a nonprofit ideological corporation, but also citing with approval the
disclosure provisions that continued to apply to the plaintiff group, and noting that “[t]hese
reporting obligations provide precisely the information necessary to monitor MCFL’s independent spending activity and its receipt of contributions”); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 791–92 & n. 32 (1978) (invalidating Massachusetts’s limitations on corporate
spending on ballot initiatives, and remarking that “the people in our democracy are entrusted
with the responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative merits of conflicting arguments,”
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v. Federal Election Commission that it again addressed disclosure in depth.24
The McConnell Court split 5-4 on the constitutionality of many of the substantive provisions of the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA).25 But
the Court was nearly unanimous in upholding the law’s expanded disclosure
requirements.26 The Court explained that “the important state interests that
prompted the Buckley Court to uphold FECA’s disclosure requirements—
providing the electorate with information, deterring actual corruption and
avoiding any appearance thereof, and gathering the data necessary to enforce
more substantive electioneering restrictions—apply in full to [the disclosure
requirements created by] BCRA.”27
In three cases in the last eight years, the Court has again reaffirmed the constitutionality of broad disclosure requirements. In Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission, which began as a case largely about disclosure, eight
Justices resoundingly upheld the constitutionality of BCRA’s expanded disclosure requirements, finding those requirements plainly justified by the “informational interest” in disclosure. (Because the Court credited this interest, it
found no need even to discuss the other government interests that might be
implicated.) Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote that “The First Amendment
protects political speech; and disclosure permits citizens and shareholders to
react to the speech of corporate entities in a proper way. This transparency
enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to
different speakers and messages.”28
Though disclosure was not directly at issue in McCutcheon v. Federal
Election Commision, in which the Court considered the constitutionality of
the aggregate limits on contributions to candidates and committees, the Court
in that case went out of its way to reaffirm that “[d]isclosure of contributions
minimizes the potential for abuse of the campaign finance system …

24
25

26

27
28

and that “[i]dentification of the source of advertising may be required as a means of disclosure,
so that the people will be able to evaluate the arguments to which they are being subjected”).
540 U.S. 93 (2003).
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified
at (codified at 52 U.S.C. § 30101, formerly 2 U.S.C. § 431 (2002)), invalided in part by Citizens
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 190–92 (opinion of Justices Stevens and O’Connor, joined
by Justices Souter and Ginsburg) (rejecting challenge to BCRA’s expanded disclosure
requirements), id. at 231 (opinion of Rehnquist, C.J., joined in relevant part by all Justices
but Thomas) (BCRA’s disclosure provisions bear “a sufficient relationship” to the important
governmental interest of “ ‘shed[ding] the light of publicity’ on campaign financing”) (internal
quotations omitted).
540 U.S. at 196.
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 370 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
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disclosure … offers a particularly effective means of arming the voting public
with information.”29
Doe v. Reed, though not a campaign finance case, represents the Court’s
last major foray into disclosure in recent years.30 Doe involved a referendum
petition to put to a popular vote a state same-sex domestic partner benefits
bill. Following the signature drive, a number of groups sought access to the
referendum petitions under the state’s public records law. Both the sponsor
and certain petition signatories brought a First Amendment challenge to the
public-records law. Construing the case as a facial challenge, the Court held
that the law, though it did implicate First Amendment interests, was justified
by the government’s compelling interest in “preserving the integrity of the
electoral process.”31 Justice Antonin Scalia concurred separately, setting forth
the view, not by its logic limited to the referendum signature context, that
“[r]equiring people to stand up in public for their political acts fosters civic
courage, without which democracy is doomed.”32
As this discussion makes clear, a strong majority of the Court has struck
a remarkably pro-disclosure note in a number of cases, including in recent
years, making disclosure a noteworthy exception to the strongly deregulatory arc of the Roberts Court in campaign finance regulation more broadly.33
And both state and lower federal courts have followed the Supreme Court’s
lead, for the most part rejecting challenges to disclosure requirements. But,
importantly, in all of the campaign finance cases discussed above, disclosure
challenges have come before the Court paired with challenges to other, more
substantive forms of campaign finance regulation; perhaps for that reason, the
Court’s disclosure discussions have generally been fairly cursory, often without
particularly developed reasoning.34 This means that the constitutional politics
of disclosure may be less stable than the excerpts above suggest.35
B. Practice
The preceding section walked through the Supreme Court’s major encounters
with disclosure. But there is a sizable gulf between the Court’s rhetoric when

29
30
31
32
33

34
35

McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
561 U.S. 186 (2010).
Id. at 197.
Id. at 228 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Richard L. Hasen, Election Law’s Path in the Roberts Court’s First Decade: A Sharp Right Turn
but with Speed Bumps and Surprising Twists, 68 Stan. L. Rev. 1597, 1604–05 (2016).
Katherine Shaw, Taking Disclosure Seriously, Yale J.L. & Pol’y Inter Alia 18, 19 (2016).
Id.
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it comes to disclosure, and the on-the-ground reality of our disclosure system.
Accordingly, this part provides a (necessarily abbreviated) overview of the
current practice of disclosure, highlighting the ways in which current practice
fails to align with the Court’s rhetoric.36

1. Dark Money and Gray Money
First, much of the money that flows through American elections today is either
not subject to public disclosure at all (“dark money”), or is disclosed in a way that
obscures the true sources of election spending (“gray money”).37
For the most part, the term “dark money” refers to money spent on
elections by social welfare groups organized under section 501(c)(4) of the
Internal Revenue Code (and to a lesser extent other exempt organizations
organized under sections 501(c)(5) and 501(c)(6) of the Code—I refer to all
of these as “social welfare” organizations throughout). Such organizations
are tax exempt, but, unlike section 501(c)(3) organizations, they are not
prohibited from engaging in political activity.38 Rather, the IRS has advised
that a social welfare organization may engage in political activity “so long as
that is not its primary activity.”39 Many such organizations have interpreted
this guidance to mean that “as long as expenditures on these activities do
not exceed fifty percent of the organization’s expenditures … anything goes
… regardless of the nature of the political activities and whether they are
in furtherance of the organization’s social welfare purposes.”40 And, though
such entities must report their expenditures on an IRS Form 990 as part of

36

37
38

39

40

The picture painted in this section is primarily of the federal system; space limitations preclude any real consideration of the practice in the states.
LEE ET AL., supra note 1, at 5.
Rev. Rul. 81–95, 1981-1 C.B. 332 (“In order to qualify for exemption under section 501(c)(4) of
the Code, an organization must be primarily engaged in activities that promote social welfare.
Although the promotion of social welfare within the meaning of section 1.501(c)(4)-1 of the
regulations does not include political campaign activities, the regulations do not impose a
complete ban on such activities for section 501(c)(4) organizations. Thus, an organization may
carry on lawful political activities and remain exempt under section 501(c)(4) as long as it is primarily engaged in activities that promote social welfare”; see also Social Welfare Organizations,
IRS.Gov, www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/other-non-profits/social-welfare-organizations. See
generally Terence Dougherty, Section 501(c)(4) Advocacy Organizations: Political CandidateRelated and Other Partisan Activities in Furtherance of the Social Welfare, 36 Seattle U. L.
Rev. 1337 (2013).
Rev. Rul. 81–95, 1981-1 C.B. 332. See also Ellen P. Aprill, Political Speech of Noncharitable
Exempt Organizations after Citizens United, 10 Election L.J. 363, 381 (2011).
Dougherty, supra note 38, at 1339.
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their annual tax filings, contributors to such entities are not made publicly
available.41
The relevant campaign finance statutes do not distinguish between forprofit and non-profit entities. But they limit meaningful disclosure in two distinct ways. As to any entity that makes an “independent expenditure” of over
$250 per year, the law requires the filing of certain reports with the FEC.
But, though federal statutes contain arguably conflicting directives about
what those reports must contain,42 the FEC has determined that independent
spenders must report the identity of contributors only for contributions “made
for the purpose of furthering the reported independent expenditure.”43 Since
most contributors do not earmark their contributions in any way, under this
interpretation there is essentially no disclosure of contributor identity.
Similarly, in the case of “electioneering”—ads that name a candidate
without expressly urging any action, like a vote for or against that candidate—
federal law would seem to require full disclosure of expenditures and
contributors above a certain level. A federal statute requires entities that spend
over $10,000 per year to disclose “names and addresses of all contributors who
contributed an aggregate amount of $1,000 or more to the person making the
disbursement” during the election cycle.44 But an FEC regulation limits such
disclosure, like independent expenditure disclosure, to contributions made
“for the purpose of furthering electioneering communications,”45 so such
contributors also typically go undisclosed.
So the IRS permits tax-exempt organizations to engage in campaign-related
activity; and the FEC requires the disclosure of contributors only where the
contributions are specifically earmarked for political activity (and they rarely
are). All of this means that a great deal of outside money is subject to no real
transparency at all. According to one study, “Dark money ads amounted to
nearly 14 percent of all ads aired in the 2012 cycle, and 47 percent of all interest
group ads.”46
The term “gray money” is typically used to refer to the activities of groups
known as “Super PACs.” These entities cropped up in the wake of the
41

42
43
44
45
46

The IRS Form 990 requires the inclusion of contributors above $5,000, but such contributors
are not subject to public disclosure. See Instructions for Form 990 Return of Organization
Exempt From Income Tax, IRS.gov, www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i990.pdf; see also Aprill, supra
note 39.
Compare 52 U.S.C. § 30104(c)(1) to 52 U.S.C. § 30104(c)(2)(C).
11 C.F.R. § 109.10(e)(1)(vi).
52 U.S.C. § 30104(f).
11 C.F.R. § 104.20(c)(9). See also Van Hollen v. FEC, 811 F.3d 486 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
Travis N. Ridout, Michael M. Franz & Erika Franklin Fowler, Sponsorship, Disclosure, and
Donors: Limiting the Impact of Outside Group Ads, 68 Pol. Res. Q. 154, 156 (2015).
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decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in SpeechNow.
org v. Federal Election Commission, which read the logic of Citizens United
as condemning limits on contributions to political committees that make
exclusively independent expenditures.47 Super PACS, though they can accept
unlimited contributions under SpeechNow, are still PACs, which means they
are required to provide detailed information to the FEC (in contrast to the
nonprofits described in the preceding section). But, importantly, the donors
whose identities they are required to report are often other entities—including
501(c)(4) organizations, which can give to PACs and then shield their own
donors as described above. So Super PAC disclosure, though in theory quite
robust, frequently provides little meaningful information about the sources of
PAC funds.

2. Hard Money: Flaws and Limitations
So the under-inclusiveness of our system of disclosure is one major problem.
But even money that is subject to disclosure—the “hard money” spent by
campaigns, parties, and regular PACs—suffers from flaws when it comes to
the collection of meaningful, high-value information of the sort voters need if
disclosure is to achieve the objectives the Supreme Court has identified.
Federal law requires campaigns and committees to provide the FEC with
the first and last name, occupation, employer, and address of any individual
who makes a contribution over $200. Despite this requirement, FEC records
reflect a number of problems, which sociologist Jennifer Heerwig has grouped
into three categories: selective compliance (donors who comply with some
but not all disclosure requirements—that is, leaving particular fields blank);
the provision of information that is vague (providing one’s occupation as
“self-employed,” say, or “slumlord”48), and dissimulation (supplying information that masks one’s true identity or interests).49 Perhaps more important,
under the current disclosure regime it is extraordinarily time-consuming to
track the activity of particular donors across elections and over periods of
time. All of this means that FEC records are often far less informative than
they might be.

47
48

49

599 F.3d 686, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
See Eric Lichtblau, White Supremacist Who Influenced Charleston Suspect Donated to 2016
G.O.P. Campaigns, N.Y. Times (June 22, 2015), www.nytimes.com/2015/06/22/us/campaigndonations-linked-to-white-supremacist.html.
Jennifer Heerwig, Diagnosing Disclosure: A Social Scientific Perspective on the Disclosure
Debate, 34 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. Inter Alia 8, 10 (2016).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Cambridge Uni Press New York, on 10 Dec 2018 at 19:01:07, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316822906.007

162

162

Katherine Shaw

3. Accessibility and Impact
To be sure, developments in technology have made information about hard
money more accessible than ever before. While FEC files once needed to
be reviewed in hard copy, they are now available for anyone with an internet
connection (though subject to some of the limitations identified above).
Interested members of the electorate can now use the FEC’s website to access
information about contributions made by specific individuals, as well as to
view graphics containing information about both congressional and presidential races. But as a general matter, the data is not presented by the FEC in a
fashion that facilitates its use by ordinary voters.
C. Empirical Research
For many years, disclosure debates unfolded without the benefit of much
research on either the costs or the benefits of disclosure.50 Social scientists
have begun to remedy that state of affairs, though much work remains to be
done. This part briefly walks through what the data show with respect to both
the costs and benefits of disclosure.
1. Quantifying Benefits
Research on the informational benefits of campaign finance disclosure
remains limited, but several studies stand out.51 First, a classic political science
text by Arthur Lupia assessed the impact of disclosure on voters in a California
ballot initiative.52 On the ballot were five distinct propositions, all related to
car insurance.53 Three separate interest groups—the insurance industry, trial
50

51

52

53

John C. Fortier & Michael J. Malbin, An Agenda for Future Research on Money in Politics in the
United States, 11 The Forum 455, 473 (2013) (“Current research on disclosure is fairly sparse,
pointing to contrary results.”). Cf. Daniel P. Tokaji & Renata E. B. Strause, How Sausage Is
Made: A Research Agenda for Campaign Finance and Lobbying, 164 U. Pa. L. Rev. Online
223, 228 (2016) (“Advocates of reform should … set aside the theoretical debate in order to
engage in an empirical assessment of the effects that present-day independent spending is
actually having on elections and governance.”).
I should note that the other interest courts have credited in the disclosure realm—preventing
corruption and the appearance of corruption—remains essentially untested as an empirical
matter. Cf. Daniel P. Tokaji & Renata E. B. Strause, The New Soft Money: Outside
Spending in Congressional Elections (2014) (reporting the results of several months of
interviews with members of Congress, candidates, and staff members, regarding the impact of
outside spending on campaigns and governance).
Arthur Lupia, Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California
Insurance Reform Elections, 88 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 63 (1994).
Id. at 64.
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lawyers, and consumer groups—had weighed in to either support or to oppose
various propositions. The study found that where voters could identify the
interest group backing a particular proposition, even poorly informed voters
were able to mirror the decision-making processes of their more well-informed
peers.54 This means, the author concluded, that, at least in the ballot-initiative
context, information about the sources of support may provide voters with
valuable data they can then use to cast better-informed votes.55
More recently, findings from a 2013 experimental study by political scientist Michael Sances suggest that disclosure about political money can supply
voters with a useful guide to candidate ideology.56 Participants in Sances’
study were shown an edited political ad in support of a candidate. The ad
discussed job creation, typically a non-partisan issue, and made no mention
of political party.57 Some participants were also shown a disclaimer indicating
that a fictional organization, “Americans for Change,” was responsible for the
advertisement.58 Two groups were also shown text that purported to list the top
contributors to “Americans for Change”: one, the “Labor Disclosure” group,
was shown a list of five labor unions; the other, the “Business Disclosure”
group, was shown a list of five corporations.59 Participants were then asked
how likely they were to vote for the candidate. Compared to subjects who were
not provided disclosures listing the top contributors to the fictional organization, Republican subjects were significantly less likely to register support for
the candidate when shown the labor contributors; Democratic subjects were
less likely to indicate support for the candidate when informed that the top
contributors were corporations.60
In another recent piece, Conor Dowling and Amber Wichowsky similarly
attempted to test the effects of disclosure by assessing whether, and how, disclosing the funders of political messages might impact the effectiveness of
those messages (here, negative or “attack” ads). In one experiment, the authors
found that where participants were shown an attack ad alone, that ad tended
to erode support for the candidate being attacked; but where participants were
also provided with information about the donors to the entity responsible
for the ad—in this instance the group American Crossroads—the disclosure

54
55
56

57
58
59
60

Id. at 72.
Id.
Michael W. Sances, Is Money in Politics Harming Trust in Government? Evidence From Two
Survey Experiments, 12 Election L.J. 53, 54 (2013).
Id. at 56.
Id. at 56.
Id. at 56–57.
Id. at 57–59.
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moved “aggregate opinion roughly back to where it would have been had
participants not watched the ad in the first place.”61 Those findings were
confirmed by another, similar study by Travis Ridout, Michael Franz and
Erika Fowler; though its findings were more complex, the authors concluded
that information about the contributors to the group responsible for an attack
ad had, in some cases, a significant impact on the perceived credibility of the
ad, and thus its effectiveness.62 And a recent piece by Abby Wood suggests that
the informational benefits of disclosure may include supplying voters with
high-value information about candidate positions on transparency itself.63
Taken together, these pieces suggest that individuals do utilize information about the sources of support in elections (whether candidate elections or
ballot initiatives). But it is clear, from these studies and others, that the form in
which the information is presented is of paramount importance. For example,
another finding of the Dowling and Wichowsky study discussed above is that
where individuals learned about the supporters of particular ads by reading
news accounts, rather than via some other mechanism, that information had
no impact on viewers’ reactions to the ad.64 This is consistent with a finding
by David Primo—that mock newspaper articles containing disclosure information had no statistically significant impact on voters’ ability to identify the
positions of interest groups on a ballot issue.65
2. Evaluating Costs
So disclosure does appear, from the limited empirical work on the topic, to
provide voters with informational benefits (though the form of disclosure
matters). But what about the other side of the equation? Does disclosure
61

62

63

64

65

Conor M. Dowling & Amber Wichowsky, Does It Matter Who’s Behind the Curtain?
Anonymity in Political Advertising and the Effects of Campaign Finance Disclosure, 41 Am.
Pol. Res. 965, 978 (2013).
Ridout et al., supra note 46. The impact of the particular disclosure varied significantly—information that an unknown entity was responsible for an attack ad made the ad more effective
than it would have been had the opposing candidate been responsible, but information that
even a small grass-roots group was responsible for the ad made the ad less credible than if there
had been no disclosure at all.
Abby K. Wood, Campaign Finance Disclosure and Voter Competence, Working Paper (on
file with author).
Dowling & Wichowsky, supra note 62, at 981 (“[W]hile identifying the top five donors in a table
format resulted in participants being more supportive of the attacked candidate compared to
only viewing the ad, we find no statistically significant evidence that reading a news article
discussing the donors to American Crossroads moved opinion”).
David M. Primo, Information at the Margin: Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws, Ballot
Issues, and Voter Knowledge, 12 Election L.J. 112, 114, 126–27 (2013).
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impose serious costs—in particular, does it deter individuals from giving political money, as some have assumed?66 To date, there is no real support for the
proposition that disclosure acts as a major deterrent to political contributions,
though some scholarship confirms the hypothesis that mandatory disclosure
will have at least some deterrent effect.
Political scientist Ray La Raja, noting that we currently lack both “a theoretical framework and empirical research”67 for evaluating the costs and
benefits of disclosure, recently reported the findings of an experimental study
designed to determine whether potential donors were deterred from giving
by the prospect of publicity.68 His results were mixed: although the prospect
of public disclosure had little to no impact on would-be donors’ willingness
to make contributions,69 information about specific thresholds above which
contributions would be publicized did result in smaller overall contributions.70
And, significantly, individuals who faced “strong interpersonal cross-pressures
from people around them”71—that is, those who reported that they were not
surrounded by like-minded individuals—were found to be “most likely to
stop giving or donate at considerably smaller amounts to avoid the threshold
amount,”72 likely because they feared the social or other costs that might result
from revealing their political preferences.
An even more recent piece by Abby Wood and Douglas Spencer relied on
reported state-level contribution data across states that both did and did not
expand state-level disclosure requirements over the period of the study. Wood
and Spencer found that contributors were “only slightly less likely to contribute in future elections in states that increase the public visibility of campaign contributions, relative to contributors in states that do not change their
disclosure laws or practices over the same time period,” and noted that for the
most part these changes in contribution behavior were negligible.73

66

67

68
69
70
71
72
73

See, e.g., Van Hollen v. FEC, 811 F.3d 486, 488 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“Disclosure chills speech”);
Michael Gilbert, Campaign Finance Disclosure and the Information Tradeoff, 98 Iowa L. Rev.
1847, 1849 (2013) (arguing that in addition to its informational benefits, disclosure can actually
“chill speech”).
Ray J. La Raja, Political Participation and Civic Courage: The Negative Effect of Transparency
on Making Small Campaign Contributions, 36 Pol. Behav. 753, 754 (2014).
Id. at 755.
Id. at 762.
Id. at 768.
Id. at 770.
Id. at 770.
Abby K. Wood & Douglas M. Spencer, In the Shadows of Sunlight: The Effects of Transparency
on State Political Campaigns 15 Election L.J. 302, 311 (2016) (estimating one “chilled” donor
per candidate).
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Beyond this scholarly work, both case law and the popular press make clear
that the targeting of individuals for harassment or retaliation based on disclosure of political contributions does occur. In Brown v. Socialist Workers
’74 Campaign Committee,74 the Court sustained a minor party’s as-applied
challenge to compelled disclosure, citing “numerous instances of recent harassment” by both private parties and the government.75 More recently, in
the course of considering a challenge to the broadcasting of the trial over
California’s Proposition 8, the 2008 ballot initiative in which California voters
amended their state’s constitution to recognize “only marriage between a man
and a woman,” the Court noted allegations of harassment, including death
threats and vandalism, against Proposition 8’s supporters.76 And press accounts
suggest that Mozilla CEO Brendan Eich resigned after his financial support
for Proposition 8 was made public.77 But neither the prevalence of this sort
of activity, nor its impact on the behavior of active or prospective donors, is
yet clear.

III. Making Disclosure Work
The preceding sections surveyed the current disclosure landscape. In this
section, I make a number of recommendations, ranging from the practical to
the theoretical, for improving this important and underappreciated element
of our system of campaign finance regulation. I am guided in this effort by
a succinct summation offered by Michael Malbin and Thomas Gais two
decades ago. Campaign finance disclosure can only work, they wrote, if:
“(1) Most candidates and political organizations report what they do accurately; (2) Such reports in fact comprise most of the activities and relationships
of importance to voters; (3) The reports are available in a useful format, and
at an accessible location; (4) Interested, knowledgeable people read and interpret the reports and then make useful information available in a timely way
to voters; (5) Voters are able and willing to use the information as a basis for
making an election decision.”78 The recommendations offered below would
bring us significantly closer to achieving these objectives.

74
75
76
77

78

459 U.S. 87 (1982).
Id. at 100–1.
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 130 S. Ct. 705, 707 (2010) (per curiam).
Alistair Barr, Mozilla CEO Brendan Eich Steps Down: Attention Focused on his Support of
Anti-Gay Marriage Ballot Proposal, Wall St. J. (Apr. 3, 2014).
Michael Malbin & Thomas L. Gais, The Day After Reform: Sobering Campaign
Finance Lessons from the States 36 (1998).
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A. Expanding Disclosure
One obvious gap in the current system is the amount of political money that is
currently not subject to meaningful disclosure. Several fixes are possible here.
First, the IRS could limit the ability of social welfare organizations to engage
in political activity. Even if it did not ban such activity outright, as it does with
501(c)(3) charitable organizations,79 it might impose a much stricter limit than
it currently allows; Ellen Aprill has suggested that such organizations might
appropriately be limited to devoting 10–15 percent of their total activities to
politicking rather than the de facto 50 percent ceiling that is currently in
effect.80 Alternatively, it could make public the information it already collects
from social welfare organization via IRS Form 990; since those entities are
already required to report contributions above $5,000, it would be a simple fix
to make such information publicly available.81
But a far better solution would be to bring all entities that engage in
election-related spending under the same disclosure regime—and, short of
the creation of a new entity, the best organization to oversee all disclosure
would be the FEC. One way to achieve this would be to expand the definition of a PAC in order to sweep in all entities that engage in campaign
spending. This could be challenging: notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s
general approval of disclosure, the Court has evidenced some concern about
what it perceives as the burdens posed by the requirements of the PAC form.
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Citizens United, in rejecting the argument that the option to speak through a PAC mitigated any constitutional
concerns about the corporate speech limitation, wrote that “PACs are burdensome alternatives; they are expensive to administer and subject to extensive regulations.”82 But, critically, that statement was made in the context of
a discussion that was predicated on the existence of meaningful disclosure by
non-PAC entities. In light of the obvious shortcomings of that assumption,

79

80
81
82

In theory, the IRS could go further by simply aligning the standards of the tax exempt
organizations that currently engage in political activity with 501(c)(3)s—in other words, by
prohibiting social welfare organizations from engaging in any political activity at all. The
Court explained in Regan v. Taxation without Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 545–46 (1983), that
the government has no obligation to subsidize political activities, like lobbying, by nonprofit
organizations. But in the post-Citizens United era, it is not clear that a categorical ban of this
sort would pass constitutional muster. See Brian Galle, Charities in Politics: A Reappraisal, 54
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1561 (2013).
Aprill, supra note 39, at 382.
Such information already appears on Schedule B of IRS Form 990. See id. at 403–4 & n. 327.
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 337 (2010).
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the Court could well come to a different conclusion about the permissibility
of imposing PAC-like requirements on all independent campaign spenders.83
Three other possibilities bear mentioning. First, a movement has cropped
up in recent years to use the Securities and Exchange Commission to require
public companies to provide shareholders with information about campaign
spending.84 Second, at least one academic proposal suggests that the Federal
Communications Commission could use existing authorities to require independent spenders to engage in disclosure as a condition of the purchase of
advertising airtime.85 Third, state nonprofit law may be another site of possible
reform, and states like California have already begun requiring nonprofits that
engage in political activity to provide the state with information about the
sources of their contributions.86 But these proposals, though constructive, are
limited in scope; they would also result in the addition of new government
entities as well as new sites of information to the regulatory mix.
B. Improving Disclosure
Several simple fixes to our hard-money system could significantly improve the
quality of campaign-finance data on what is still the most important source of
money in federal elections.87 First, the use of standardized forms at the FEC,
perhaps with drop-down menus of the sort used in the Census long form, would
facilitate the provision of more useful information, and eliminate the prospect
of evasive or non-responsive answers. Second, donors should be given unique
ID numbers, which would facilitate identification—by scholars, journalists,
and interested and engaged voters—of the largest and most significant donors.
83

84

85

86

87

Cf. Marcia Coyle, Justice Anthony Kennedy Loathes the Term Swing Vote, Nat’l L.J.
(Oct. 27, 2015), www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202740827841/Justice-Anthony-KennedyLoathes-the-Term-Swing-Vote?slreturn=20160905224907.
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Shining Light on Corporate Political Spending, 101
Geo L.J. 923, 925 (2013) (arguing that “the SEC should develop rules requiring public companies to disclose political spending to shareholders”).
Lili Levi, Plan B for Campaign-Finance Reform: Can the FCC Help Save American Politics
After Citizens United?, 61 Cath. U. L. Rev. 97, 101 (2011) (arguing that the FCC can use
existing authority “to require third-party purchasers of airtime for political and advocacy
advertising to disclose their major direct and indirect funding sources and principal directors,
officers, or operators”).
See Linda Sugin, Politics, Disclosure, and State Law Solutions for 501(c)(4) Organizations, 91
Chi.-Kent. L. Rev. 895 (2016).
Jennifer Heerwig, supra note 49, at 10 (2016). See also Races in Which Outside Spending
Exceeds Candidate Spending, 2014 Election Cycle, Center for Responsive
Politics, www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/outvscand.php?cycle=2014 (showing that in
the 2014 congressional campaigns, outside groups outspent candidates in 28 races, but that
candidates spent more in the remaining 443).
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These two simple fixes would considerably improve the quality of data the
FEC collects and maintains.
C. Delivering Disclosure
The FEC has made significant strides in making its data publicly available
in recent years, including the very recent launch of a more interactive web
portal. But a still more effective disclosure regime would allow voters to use
the FEC’s website to explore the vectors of political influence—perhaps, for
example, by showing voters how much money a particular official has received
from high-dollar contributors, or the industries or sectors from which most
donations to a particular candidate come.
Even a vastly improved FEC website, however, would have limited impact,
as only a small subset of the electorate engages directly with such data. If disclosure is actually to impact the behavior of voters, it needs to be presented
to voters at a time and in a format that could actually affect voting behavior.
Although American citizens are not going to become perfectly informed voters
anytime soon, individuals with limited information are certainly capable of
making informed choices.88 The challenge, then, is how best to provide voters
with information that might empower and enable them to do that.
Archon Fung, Mary Graham, and David Weil, the authors of the seminal text
Full Disclosure: The Perils and Promise of Transparency,89 describe restauranthygiene disclosure as a paradigmatic example of successful disclosure. As they
explain, hygiene grades (“A,” “B,” “C”), typically posted in restaurant windows,
“have become highly embedded in customers’ … decisional processes.
A restaurant’s grade is available when users need it … where they need it … and
in a format that makes complex information quickly comprehensible.”90
How, then, to deliver campaign finance information to voters in a way that
mirrors what is so effective about restaurant sanitation grades? Disclaimers,
88

89

90

See Elizabeth Garrett & Daniel A. Smith, Veiled Political Actors and Campaign Disclosure
Laws in Direct Democracy, 4 Election L.J. 295, 296 (2005) (“No voter needs to acquire all
available information to competently make a reasoned decision. Instead, she can rely on particular pieces of information, connected non-accidentally to accurate conclusions about the
consequences of her vote, and still vote competently.”)
Archon Fung, Mary Graham & David Weil, Full Disclosure: The Perils and
Promise of Transparency (2007). Specifically, they write, “Successful policies focus first
on the needs and interests of information users, as well as their abilities to comprehend
the information provided by the system.…They seek to embed new facts in the decisionmaking routines of information users and to embed user responses in the decision making of
disclosers,” Id. at 11.
Id. at 83.
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which appear as part of political advertisements, are one obvious site of potential reform. At present, a provision of federal law upheld in Citizens United
requires independent spenders to include in their ads disclaimers that read “__
__ is responsible for the content of this advertising,” both spoken and displayed
on the screen for at least four seconds.91 (Candidates’ own ads are subject to
similar requirements.92) But because such entities typically use names that are
benign, patriotic-sounding, and generally uninformative,93 the disclosed information does not ordinarily communicate much of value.
Justin Levitt has proposed the creation of a “Democracy Facts” label to
appear within campaign communications, “emphasizing simple proxies for
the quantity and fervor of local support for a particular communication,”
including the number of supporters in a given jurisdiction, as well as the percentage of support supplied by top donors.94 This sort of detail could make
disclaimers more genuinely informative. Another possibility would be to
require organizations to craft a mission or policy statement for inclusion in
their disclaimers. As research like the Lupia study described above shows,
information about the supporters of particular causes and messages can equip
voters to make choices that better align with their preferences. Of course,
choosing between two or more candidates is quite distinct from the decision
about where to eat dinner. But the general point—that information should be
delivered near in time to voting and in an accessible format—seems entirely
applicable.
D. Testing and Theorizing Disclosure
Another important task is more academic: the need to engage in additional empirical research on how best to design and deliver disclosure, and,
relatedly, to develop a more fully realized set of arguments that emphasize
the constitutional values advanced by disclosure. As a number of scholars
have noted,95 in the post-Citizens United era, opponents of campaign finance
regulation have begun to focus on challenging the premises of disclosure

91
92

93
94

95

2 U.S.C. § 441d(d)(1)(B) (2002).
Citizens United, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 280 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 441d(a)(3) (2002)). The law also
requires the sponsors of ads to provide in the disclaimers identifying information that includes
the name, address, and phone number or website of the sponsor.
Heerwig & Shaw, supra note 2, at 1496.
Justin Levitt, Confronting the Impact of Citizens United, 29 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 217, 227–28
(2010). For a visual representation of Levitt’s “Democracy Facts,” see http://electionlawblog
.org/archives/DemocracyFacts.html.
Michael Kang, Campaign Disclosure in Direct Democracy, 97 Minn. L. Rev. 1700, 1700 (2013)
(“[C]ampaign disclosure laws now are under legal and political attack as never before.”).
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laws;96 meanwhile, the affirmative case for disclosure has lagged behind. Establishing a solid theoretical and empirical framework is critical both to designing
better disclosure and to successfully defending disclosure against attack.97
E. Taking Privacy Seriously
Finally, any attempts to improve disclosure along the lines described above
should take seriously the privacy concerns disclosure implicates.98 One way
to address privacy concerns is to explore partially de-identifying campaign
finance data before public release. Bruce Cain has written in favor of what he
calls “semi-disclosure”;99 noting that the government already employs a kind of
semi-disclosure in the case of the census, aggregating identifying information
to avoid revealing sensitive personal details, he suggests that we ought to do
the same with campaign finance data. This insight has a definite appeal; at the
very least, in the internet age, the benefits of requiring donors to supply a physical address seems outweighed by the potential privacy threats represented by
the availability of such information online. One additional possibility is the
creation of a tiered system in which data about small donors are available only
in the aggregate, while the identity of donors above a certain threshold, which
is of additional informational value, would be revealed.100

IV. Conclusion
For many years, disclosure has played a largely ancillary role in debates about
money in politics. But any serious reform proposal today should include
disclosure—both because it has genuine potential for improving our democracy,
and because a functioning system of disclosure may well be a necessary predicate to building the case for other sorts of substantive campaign finance reform.
96

97

98

99

100

See, e.g., Bradley A. Smith, Scott Blackburn & Luke Wachob, Compulsory Donor
Disclosure: When Government Monitors its Citizens, www.heritage.org/research/reports/
2015/11/compulsory-donor-disclosure-when-government-monitors-its-citizens; Cleta Mitchell,
Donor Disclosure: Undermining the First Amendment, 96 Minn. L. Rev. 1755, 1759 (2012)
(“Disclosure is the next frontier for those of us who toil in these vineyards—it will constitute
the next wave of legal jurisprudence in the campaign finance arena. In the same way litigants
challenged these substantive prohibitions on certain kinds of speech, over time we have to
make the case and build a record about the threat posed by disclosure.”).
Abby Wood has compiled an excellent list of possible directions for future empirical work. See
Wood, supra note 63, at 14–15.
See McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (holding that Ohio prohibition
on anonymous pamphleteering fails to satisfy exacting scrutiny).
Bruce Cain, Shade from the Glare: The Case for Semi-Disclosure, Cato Unbound (Nov. 8,
2010), www.cato-unbound.org/2010/11/08/bruce-cain/shade-glare-case-semi-disclosure.
Heerwig & Shaw, supra note 2, at 1494.
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